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Abstract—Synchrophasor systems are becoming a vital re-
quirement for real-time monitoring, control and protection of
emerging Smart Grids that need cyber security issues be care-
fully analysed and mitigated. This paper proposes a behaviour-
based ontology on the Syncrophasor communications for the
detection of malicious system behaviours. Syncrophasor activities
are represented with their causal relationships using a flexible
semantic model. The developed model bridges the gap between
system behaviours and the exchanged data and commands in
the network. A set of semantic rules are created to assist
in identifying malicious activities that are deviating from the
expected behaviour in the model. The proposed approach is pro-
totyped and tested for its applicability in detecting cyber-attacks.
Furthermore, a use case for valuable information extraction is
described using query-based engine over the ontology knowledge.
The presented results demonstrate the usefulness and flexibility
of the proposed approach in detecting malicious activities that
could improve Syncrophasor network security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) are time-synchronized
devices that measure parameters of power quality such as
voltages, currents, frequencies and phase angles in real-time.
The measured data enable monitoring the performance and
stability of power in the grid. Therefore, PMU (also known
as Synchrophasor) plays a vital role in providing real-time
monitoring, control and protection in future smart grids. PMU
systems exchange their data over the IEEE C37.118 commu-
nication protocol which unfortunately does not provide any
authenticity or encryption over the exchanged communica-
tions. This makes Synchrophasor exposed to several cyber-
attacks [1] including Denial of Service (DoS) and Man in
the Middle (MiTM) that could lead to severe time-delay or
degradation in future smart grid control strategies that rely
on Synchrophasor communications. Therefore, cyber security
issues are considered a priority and need to be carefully
analysed and mitigated.
This paper proposes an ontology-based approach for the
analysis and monitoring of Synchrophasor systems to allow
detection of malicious activities and cyber-attacks. In this ap-
proach, the characteristics of Synchrophasor communications
are captured with their causal relationships using a flexible
semantic model. The data extracted from the communications
can be linked to real system behaviours, therefore, the gap
between real system behaviours and exchanged data is bridged.
A set of semantic rules were constructed to identify malicious
activities that deviate from the expected behaviours in the
model. The proposed approach is prototyped in Java and tested
for its applicability using Man in the Middle attack scenario.
This work is mainly motivated by the attractive features
of ontology that can enhance the information extraction and
analysis in Synchrophasor networks. First, an ontology pro-
vides a flexible way in representing and processing large
amount of data that could be produced by PMU systems
at their high rate of transmission. The knowledge can be
presented at various levels of abstraction and in easy machine-
interpretable formats. Second, a rich set of semantic-level
capabilities are made possible that includes mapping heteroge-
neous information sources obtained from both operational and
non-operational prospective, extracting logical relationships
between domain concepts, applying automated reasoning and
contextual enhancement on the data. Despite the fact that
benefits of ontology have been accepted and utilized in power
system domain, its use is still limited and no research inves-
tigated applying ontology-based intrusion detection in IEEE
C37.118 communications.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents a brief background about Syncrophasor and sum-
marizes recent work on ontology based systems. The proposed
approach is presented in Section III. The experimental results
on the proposed approach are presented in Section IV. Finally,
Section V concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Syncrophasor Technology
Syncrophasor technology is used for real-time operations
and off-line engineering analyses to improve grid reliability
and efficiency and lower the operational cost. Typically used
technologies include Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs), Pha-
sor Data concentrators (PDCs) and IT communication systems.
PMU devices measure the electrical waves on electricity
grids that may be distributed over large geographical area.
Each measurement is time-stamped using a common time
source such as Global Positioning System (GPS) which allow
time alignment on collected measurements for comprehensive
view of the entire grid. On the other hand, PDCs gather
measurement data from several PMUs with ability to filter
out bad data before it can be transmitted to other information
systems for monitoring and control purposes.
The typical flow between a PMU and a PDC over the
IEEE C37.118 communication protocol is depicted in Figure
Fig. 1. Syncrophasor Communications Flow
1. The PDC instructs a PMU to send its configuration using
the send configuration control command. The PMU respond
with its configuration which provides description on how to
decode exchanged measurement data. The PDC then instructs
the PMU to start its data transmission that will take place until
further command to stop transmission is received.
B. Ontology Approaches for Power System Networks
In recent years, the use of ontology in the electric power
industry has received an increasing research attention. On-
tology is an artificial intelligence technique that formally
represents the concepts within a domain with their relationship.
It enables powerful capabilities in controlling the level of
details on information and automatically extracting, enhanc-
ing and analysing large amount of data. Several approaches
with different applications of ontology were seen in power
system domain that include system modelling, multi-type data
management [2]–[4], big data analysis [5], [6], fault diagnosis
[7], [8] and network security [9], [10].
In [10] an ontology-based approach on intrusion alerts
is presented for the detection of cyber-attacks on SCADA
systems. However, the presented ontology is focused on post-
analysis of intrusion alerts and vulnerability information in
SCADA networks and does not provide detection from raw
network data.
Wang et. al [7] proposed an ontology-based fault diag-
nosis for power transformers. The presented ontology is
used to integrate various transformers diagnostic information
such as thermal condition monitoring, dissolved gas analysis,
discharge and frequency response analysis for faults iden-
tification. Similarly, the work presented in [8] proposed a
semantic information model for power grid fault diagnosis
based on Common Information Model (CIM), that is based
on IEC61850 communications.
The authors in [11] used an ontology based approach to
reason about heterogeneous data sources to find ringlets in
the power distribution network and detect power-transformer
utilization for a given substation. In [9] the authors proposed
an ontology-based framework for event understanding and
representation in smart grids. The presented approach enables
the extraction of high-level information from PMU data and
evaluating semantic rules for the detection of basic events such
as voltage level over a service area.
Supported by the increasing number of proposals on
ontology-based systems in the power grid domain, it is clear
that the importance and benefits of ontology in representing
and analysing the knowledge within the domain are real-
ized. However, no research has focused on utilizing ontology
for intrusion detection in Synchrophasor network over IEEE
C37.118 protocol. With its flexibility and reasoning capability
over large amount of data, an ontology can provide a valuable
contribution in detecting malicious Synchrophasor behaviours
and enhancing the network security.
III. PROPOSED APPROACH
The proposed approach utilizes an ontology-based be-
haviour modelling of the Syncrophasor systems that use the
IEEE C37.118 communication protocol. The developed ontol-
ogy captures the domain knowledge about expected behaviours
of the monitored systems and applies logical reasoning to
recognise and classify malicious activities. More precisely, the
capabilities and characteristics of PMU and PDC systems are
monitored with a linkage to the exchanged data and control
commands in the network. Furthermore, a set of detection rules
are developed for the detection of malicious activities that does
not match the defined characteristics of Syncrophasor systems
in the ontology.
A. Behaviours Representation using Ontology
Syncrophasor systems are distinguished from traditional
IT networks by their regularity of communications which
includes a fixed number of devices and specific communication
protocols. Each type of system may have a particular number
of behaviours based on its role that may include the following:
A PMU can send its header, configuration, and mea-
surement data to a PDC. Other behaviours that could be
indicated by the exchanged data are starting or stopping data
transmission, reporting PMU errors or time synchronization
issues, transmitting invalid data or announcing configuration
changes on PMU side.
A PDC may send various control commands to enable
header and configuration retrieval, control start and stop of
data transmission on PMUs.
The IEEE C37.118 protocol specifications [12] explicitly
indicate that only measured and computed data shall be
transmitted by a PMU. Any other information is to be only
sent when requested. Furthermore, sending control commands
is only allowed by PDC.
The developed ontology captures various system behaviours
and their inter-relationship that are linked to the actual net-
work communications. A high-level view of this ontology is
depicted in Figure 2. In the ontology, PMU and PDC systems
(concepts) are considered Synchrophasor equipments that have
different characteristics and relationships to the exchanged
data in the network over the IEEE C37.118 protocol. A PMU
has information (Header, Configuration and Measurement
data) that could be used by behaviours (send header, send
configuration, send measurements) as response to Control
commands (request for header or configuration, instruction
to start data transmission) sent by a PDC.
Fig. 2. Behaviour Ontology Model for Syncrophasor systems
B. Rule-base Construction
Rules play a very important role in ontology based sys-
tems. They can be constructed for different purposes such
as mapping data to ontology, inferring concepts relationship,
automating reasoning over acquired knowledge for context
enhancement, and searching for specific information in the
knowledge base.
In this paper, a set of rules was developed to identify sus-
picious system behaviours and cyber-attacks. These rules are
constructed using the Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL)
and are evaluated against the raw network traffic represented
in Resource Description Format (RDF). RDF is a standard
used to describe data as triples that consists of Subject,
Predicate, and Object. An excerpt of SWRL rules used within
the ontology is presented in Table I. It should be noted that the
presented rules are meant to describe how detection rules for
various activities may be constructed. It is intended that further
rules will be developed to capture other malicious activities
with the Syncrophasor systems.
The presented detection rules in Table I provide the meaning
to capture different suspicious activities of monitored systems.
Rule 1 is triggered when a PMU system is attempting to send
a control command which conflicts to the protocol specifi-
cations. Rules 2 to 5 concern monitoring the PMU system
changes such as reported errors, time synchronisation issues,
configurations and rate of transmission changes respectively.
This information is extracted from the PMU data frames.
Furthermore, rules 6 to 8 enable the detection of suspicious
devices that attempt first time communication to an existing
system, injected configuration messages that does not match
TABLE I
AN EXCERPT OF SWRL RULES USED WITHIN THE BEHAVIOUR
ONTOLOGY
Rule Content
Rule1 := IsPMU(?m) ˆ SendControlCommand(?m, ?c) –>Compro-
misedPMU(?m)
Rule2 := IsPMU(?m) ˆ hasBehaviour(?b) ˆ hasStatusChange(?b,
PMUerror) –>PMUwithError(?m)
Rule3 := IsPMU(?m) ˆ hasBehaviour(?b) ˆ hasStatusChange(?b, Out-
TimeSync) –>PMUSyncIssue(?m)
Rule4 := IsPMU(?m) ˆ hasBehaviour(?b) ˆ hasStatusChange(?b, Con-
figChange) –>PMUConfigChange(?m)
Rule5 := IsPMU(?m) ˆ hasBehaviour(?b) ˆ hasStatusChange(?b, Tran-
sRateChange) –>PMUrateChange(?m)
Rule6 := IsPMU(?m) ˆ isPDC(?d) ˆ communicateWith(?m, ?d) ˆ ,First-
TimeCommunication(?m, ?d) –>NewDeviceCommunication(?m, ?d)
Rule7 := IsPMU(?m) ˆ sendConfiguration(?b, ?c) ˆ hasChange-
Count(?c, ?h) ˆ swrlb:lessThan(?h, previousConfigChangeCount)
–>SuspiciousConfiguration(?c)
Rule8 := IsPMU(?m) ˆ sendConfiguration(?b, ?c) ˆ hasLength(?c, ?l)
ˆ lessThan(?l, previousConfigLength) –>SuspiciousConfiguration(?c)
Rule9 := IsDevice(?s) ˆ hasIPaddress(?s, ?ip) ˆ (hasMacAddress >=2)
(?s) –>ARPspoofed(?s)
the expected sequence of configuration change count or the
observed length over time, respectively. Finally, rule 9 allows
easy identification of systems with more than one unique
physical MAC address but pointing to the same IP address
which indicates ARP spoofing attempt.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In order to test the proposed approach for malicious system
behaviour detection, a prototype tool is developed on the
open-source Jena API [13] in Java language. Jena provides
a rich set of capabilities for processing ontology models
and creating data instances that will be evaluated using the
semantic detection rules. The research test-bed used for this
paper, which is depicted in Figure 3, contains a local PDC
(IP:10.27.1.2, MAC:08:00:27:db:3a:a9), PMU(IP:10.27.1.55,
MAC: 08:00:27:83:15:6a), Historian Database and Attacker
system (IP:10.27.1.211, MAC:08:00:22:55:66:7a). The open-
source Synchrophasor simulator (OpenPDC [14]) is used for
PMU and PDC traffic generation over the IEEE C37.118 pro-
tocol. The Man in the Middle and malicious packet injection
attack is performed using pyPMU Python library for IEEE
C37.118 and Metasploit [15] tools.
Fig. 3. High-level view of the test-bed architecture
A. Man in the Middle (MiTM)
The MiTM attack is a form of an active eavesdropping
where an attacker can place himself in the middle of a PMU
and a PDC communication. A common technique used to
achieve this attack is the use of ARP spoofing. A successful
MiTM attack gives the attacker almost full observation and
control over the exchanged data which include the ability to
manipulate real-time measurements, configurations and control
commands.
The proposed system was successfully able to detect vari-
ous malicious activities in the simulated attack scenario. For
referencing purposes, each packet in the communication flow
is assigned a unique packet identifier (e.g., C37PacketXXXX)
by the proposed system. First, the ARP spoofing is detected
by Rule 9 where a new MAC address 08:00:22:55:66:7a
(Attacker MAC) has been observed on a specific PMU system
with IP address 10.27.1.55 as shown in Table II. As previous
packets were monitoring and stored in the knowledge base, the
count of MAC addresses can be useful for better judgement on
which of the addresses can be considered malicious. Therefore,
an alert can be generated as:
10/12-14:14:16.520000 [**] [RULE9] C37_ONTOLOGY_IDS:
Suspicious MAC address (08:00:22:55:66:7a) has been
observed for PMU system (10.27.1.55), possible ARP Spoofing
[Classification:Attempted-MiTM][Priority:1]{TCP:IEEEC37.118}
10.27.1.55:47122 -> 10.27.1.2:46864 (PDC44)
Second, the attacker proceeds in his attack by inject-
ing data and configuration frames in the communications
as presented in Table III. The attacker captured some data
frames sent by the PMU and issued a control command to
instruct the PMU in stopping its active data transmission (as
observed in C37Packet7730). Then, an injected data frame
(C37Packet7731) indicating PMU configuration change is sent
by the attacker. The PDC responded by requesting the con-
figuration of the PMU as seen in packet (C37Packet7733).
This request was captured by the attacker and a malicious
configuration frame is injected as a response (C37Packet7735).
However, the system observed that the later configuration
message contains a suspicious change counter and length
compared to previously captured system communications.
Therefore, an alert is generated as:
10/12-14:14:18.401603 [**] [*] C37_ONTOLOGY_IDS: Malicious
Configuration frame has been observed in combination
with spoofed data frame. Possible MiTM is in place.
[Classification:Attempted-MiTM][Priority:1]{TCP:IEEEC37.118}
10.27.1.55:47122 -> 10.27.1.2:46864 (PDC44)
In conclusion, the identified sequence of PMU sys-
tem behaviour and communications is PMUBehaviour1 =
{InActiveDataTransmission, StoppedDataTransmission, Sent-
DataFrame, SentConfiguration, SentDataFrames} which con-
flicts with the expected system behaviour where a PMU can
not send data frames if it is already in an inactive transmission
state.
B. Application on Behaviour Knowledge Extraction
The proposed approach could be also used for behaviour
knowledge extraction in Synchrophasor networks. The ex-
tracted information may provide a valuable contribution for
gaining in-depth understanding of system behaviours or to
be used as pre-knowledge to intelligent data mining and
machine learning algorithms. SPARQL [16] query language
contains the required capabilities for information extraction
which include querying RDF graphs with support to regular
expressions and variables evaluation. Examples of information
in Synchrophasor communications include, but not limited to,
are the following:
• Which devices had communicated with a specific PMU
over time?
• What commands have been sent towards a PMU (e.g.,
Send configuration, send header, start and stop of data
transmission)?
• How many and which type of packets have been trans-
mitted between two systems over a given time? For
detection of changes in rate of transmission caused by
data injection attacks.
• What packet lengths observed for every frame type used
in PMU and PDC communications? To detect possible
over-sized packets.
• Which PMU reported errors, time synchronization issues
or changes in configuration or transmission rate?
TABLE II
ARP SPOOFING DETECTION BY FINDING DUPLICATED MAC ADDRESSES AND THEIR COUNTS
PacketID Last Time-Stamp SourceMAC SourceIP DestinationIP DestinationSystem Frame Types Count
C37Packet7725 Oct 12, 2016 14:14:15.000000000 UTC 08:00:27:83:15:6a 10.27.1.55 10.27.1.2 PDC44 Data Frame 6716
C37Packet7731 Oct 12, 2016 14:14:16.520000000 UTC 08:00:22:55:66:7a 10.27.1.55 10.27.1.2 PDC44 Data Frame 1
TABLE III
MALICIOUS ACTIVITY SEQUENCES THAT INVOLVE DATA AND CONFIGURATION INJECTION ATTEMPTS
PacketID Time-Stamp SourceMAC SourceIP DestinationMAC DestinationIP FrameType Config-Changed Length
C37Packet7730 Oct 12, 2016
14:14:15.740030
UTC
08:00:22:55:66:7a 10.27.1.211 08:00:27:83:15:6a 10.27.1.55 Command Frame
(Stop Data Trans-
mission)
84
C37Packet7731 Oct 12, 2016
14:14:16.520000
UTC
08:00:22:55:66:7a 10.27.1.55 08:00:27:db:3a:a9 10.27.1.2 Data Frame Yes 100
C37Packet7733 Oct 12, 2016
14:14:17.310023
UTC
08:00:27:db:3a:a9 10.27.1.2 08:00:22:55:66:7a 10.27.1.55 Command Frame
(send CFG-2
frame)
84
C37Packet7735 Oct 12, 2016
14:14:17.564003
UTC
08:00:22:55:66:7a 10.27.1.55 08:00:27:db:3a:a9 10.27.1.2 ConfigV2 Frame 460
• Which execution sequences appeared in a PMU and PDC
communication? For detection of malicious sequences.
• What PMU data (e.g., Frequency deviation from nominal)
values have been reported over time and do they violate
specified thresholds?
V. CONCLUSION
Synchrophasor systems are playing a vital role in wide-area
monitoring, control and protection of emerging Smart Grids.
However, a number of cyber security issues need to be care-
fully analysed and mitigated. This paper has proposed a novel
approach based on ontology for malicious system behaviours
detection in Synchrophasor network. The experimental results
indicated that the proposed system can be implemented as
an effective tool for the analysis and detection of abnormal
behaviours. Ontology enables representing large volume of
exchanged data that can be integrated and mapped to real be-
haviours of Synchrophasor systems in a machine-interpretable
format. Furthermore, the powerful semantic-level capabilities
such as automated reasoning, contextual enhancement and
correlation over acquired knowledge make the ontology as an
excellent potential for intelligent information analysis in the
next generation IDSs. The presented ontology model will be
updated by detailed PMU data definitions (e.g., Voltages and
Frequencies) for extended system profiling and monitoring.
For example, frequency deviation and voltage levels may
be used for detection of an ongoing cyber attack such as
measurement injection.
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